LUFTFARTSVERKET
Luftfartsinspektionen

LUFTVÄRDIGHETSDIREKTIV (LVD)

A. Helikopter
MDHI
LVD Nr 2990

Sektion 2. Utlandstillverkad flygmateriel

TITEL: **Kontroll av stjärtrotornav - tillverkningsfel**

GÄLLER: 369D och 369E med installerade nav P/N 369D21701-21 (fyrbladig stjärtrotor)

ÅTGÄRD: Utför åtgärder angivna i bofogad kopia av Priority Letter AD 99-13-09

TID FÖR ÅTGÄRD: Före flygning om ej tidigare utfört

UNDERLAG: FAA Priotiry Letter AD 99-13-09
MD Helicopters Inc Service Bulletin SB369D-198, SB369E-092 daterade den 10 maj 1999, eller senare utgåva

REFERENS: FAA Priority Letter AD 99-13-09

BESLUTSDATUM: 1999-06-18

LFS 1999:114

Åtgärder enligt LVD utgör nödvändig förutsättning för ifrågavarande flygmateriels luftvärdighet. Referens BCL M 1.11.
Anteckning om åtgärd, som vidtagits i enlighet med LVD, skall införas i teknisk journal för berörd flygmateriel med hänvisning till ifrågavarande LVD-nummer. Angivet underlag refererar till senast gällande revision/utgåva. LVD utges i luftfartsverkets författningssamlingar LFS.

Postadress	Gatuadress	Telefonnummer	Telegram	Telex
601 79 NORRKÖPING	Vikboplan 11	011-192000	Civilair Norrköping	62450

Bilaga till LVD 2990

PRIORITY LETTER AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE

REGULATORY SUPPORT DIVISION
P.O. BOX 26460
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA 73125-0460

U.S. Department
of Transportation
Federal Aviati
Administration

DATE: June 16, 1999
99-13-09

This Priority Letter Airworthiness Directive (AD) is prompted by reports from the manufacturer of the discovery of a discrepant part. During the manufacturing process, an unknown number of certain four-bladed tail rotor fork (fork) assemblies were incorrectly machined in critical areas after the shot-peening process. The two ridges on each of the arms of the fork assemblies were incorrectly machined off. This condition, if not corrected, could result in failure of certain fork assemblies, which could cause loss of a tail rotor blade and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.

The FAA has reviewed MDHI Service Bulletin SB369D- 198, SB369E- 092, dated May 10, 1999 (SB), which describes procedures for inspecting and replacing each fork assembly, P/N 369D21701-21, with an airworthy fork assembly.

Since an unsafe condition has been identified that is likely to exist or develop on other MDHI Model 369D and E helicopters of the same type design, this AD requires, prior to further flight, inspecting and replacing, if necessary, the fork assembly, P/N 369D21701- 21, with an airworthy fork assembly. This AD also requires a repetitive inspection of P/N 369D21701-21 without ridges, at intervals not to exceed 50 hours TIS and removing and replacing, if necessary, each unairworthy fork assembly with an airworthy fork assembly, before further flight. The actions are required to be accomplished in the area defined in Figure 1 of this AD.

This rule is issued under 49 U.S.C. Section 44701 pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, and is effective immediately upon receipt of this priority letter.

99-13-09 MD HELICOPTERS, INC.: Priority Letter issued on June 16, 1999. Docket No. 99-SW-40-AD.

Applicability: Model 369D and E helicopters, with four- bladed tail rotor fork (fork) assemblies, part numbers (P/N) 369D21701-21, installed, certificated in any category.

NOTE 1: This AD applies to each helicopter identified in the preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been otherwise modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the requirements of this AD. For helicopters that have been modified, altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of this AD is affected, the owner/operator must request approval for an alternative method of compliance in accordance with paragraph (d) of this AD. The request should include an assessment of the effect of the modification, alteration, or repair on the unsafe condition addressed by this AD; and if the unsafe condition has not been eliminated, the request should include specific proposed actions to address it.

Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously.

To prevent failure of the fork assembly, P/N 369D21701- 21, which can result in loss of a tail rotor blade and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter, accomplish the following:

(a) Before further flight, inspect each fork assembly, P/N 369D21701-21, for the presence of ridges on the arms. See Figure 1, sheets 1 and 2.

NOTE 2: MD Helicopters, Inc., Service Bulletin SB369D- 198, SB369E- 092, dated May 10, 1999, pertains to the subject of this AD.

(1) If ridges are found, no further action is required by this AD.

(2) If no ridges are found, chemically remove paint from the machined areas, inspect the fork assembly for a crack using the dye-penetrant procedure of MIL-STD-6866 or ASTM-E1417, and conduct a visual inspection using a 10X or higher magnifying glass. (See Figure 1, sheets 1 and 2.) Replace a cracked fork assembly with an airworthy fork assembly. A fork assembly without ridges, P/N 369D21701-21, may not be installed.

NOTE 3: The fork assembly is titanium, which requires dwell times for the dye penetrant inspection that are appropriate for titanium.

(b) Thereafter, at intervals not to exceed 50 hours time-in-service (TIS), visually inspect each fork assembly without ridges, P/N 369D21701-21, for a crack using a 10X or higher magnifying glass. (See Figure 1, sheets 1 and 2.) If a crack is found, replace the cracked fork assembly with an airworthy fork assembly. A fork assembly without ridges, P/N 369D21701-21, may not be installed.

(c) Replacing an unairworthy fork assembly with an airworthy fork assembly other than P/N 369D21701-21 without ridges constitutes terminating action for this AD

(d) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA. Operators shall submit their requests through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office.

NOTE 4: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office.

(e) Special flight permits will not be issued.

(f) Priority Letter AD 99-13-09, issued June 16, 1999, becomes effective upon receipt.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John L. Cecil, Aerospace Engineer, FAA, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, Airframe Branch, 3960 Paramount Blvd., Lakewood, California 90712, telephone (562) 627-5228, fax (562) 627-5210.